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Abstract      
 
We consider the optimal licensing strategy of an insider patentee in a circular city of 
Salop’s model and in a linear city of Hotelling’s model when firms have asymmeytric pre-
innovation marginal costs of production and compete in prices. We completely characterize the 
optimal licensing policies using a fixed fee and per-unit royalty under the drastic and non-drastic 
innovations. We find that when the innovative firm is efficient compared to the licensee at the 
pre-innovation stage then the results regarding optimal licensing policy coincide with the results 
described in the literature with symmetric firms. However, this is not true when the innovative 
firm is inefficient in the pre-innovation stage compared to the licensee. To that end, we show that 
even a drastic innovation can be licensed using a royalty scheme when the patentee is highly 
inefficient compared to licensee in the pre-innovation stage and the size of the innovation is 
intermediate. We also show that in this set-up, fixed fee licensing is never optimal.  
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1  Introduction 
 
Patent licensing is a fairly common practice that takes place in almost all industries. It is a source 
of profit for the innovator (also called licensor or patentee) who earns rent from the licensee by 
transferring a new technology. The theoretical literature has mainly considered the following 
three modes of patent licensing: a royalty on per unit of output produced with the patented 
technology, a fixed fee that is independent of the quantity produced with the patented technology, 
or an auction of a certain number of licenses, that is, offering a fixed number of licenses to the 
highest bidders. As for the patentee is concerned, two types are studied closely, namely the 
outsider and insider patentee. When the patentee is an independent R&D organization and not a 
competitor of the licensee in the product market, it is an outsider patentee; whereas when it 
competes with the licensee it becomes an insider patentee. In the literature on insider patentee, 
which is also the focus of this paper, the transfer of new technology is essentially studied in a 
framework where the competing firms are symmetric in terms of costs of production in the pre-
innovation stage. We depart from this standard framework to an environment where the 
competing firms are asymmetric in terms of costs of production at the pre-innovation stage. The 
patentee can be inefficient or efficient compared to the licensee in our framework. There we ask 
the question does the pre-innovation cost asymmetry matter when it is compared with the 
symmetric case as for the optimal licensing is concerned? We find the answer to this question can 
be yes and no. It does not matter when the innovative firm is efficient relative to the licensee and 
there the results regarding optimal licensing policy coincide with the case when the firms are 
symmetric. However, it does matter when the innovative firm is inefficient compared to the 
licensee; and there the decision to license (using appropriate policy) or not very much depends on 
the size of the cost-reducing innovation and the degree of pre-innovation cost asymmetry. Thus 
doing the analysis of insider patent licensing in a more general framework like this gives us some 
valuable insight related to the pre-innovation cost structures of the competing firms and optimal 
licensing. Also realistically speaking in any market, no two firms are exactly symmetric; they are 
asymmetric in nature in almost all the time. Thus, an analysis of this nature is vital to realistically 
understand the licensing pattern in various industries.
1
 We aim to do that in the paper.
2
  
                                                          
1
 See Rostoker (1983), Caves et al. (1983), Macho-Stadler et al. (1996), Jensen and Thursby (2001) and Vishwasrao 
(2007), among others for empirical findings on the nature licensing contracts in various industries. 
 
2
 Poddar and Sinha (2010) in a recent paper, first studied optimal patent licensing in a situation where firms are 
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Now to study optimal patent licensing in a spatial competition, we use the framework of 
the two most celebrated spatial models in economics, namely the circular model of Salop (1979) 
and linear model of Hotelling (1929). There is a vast literature (see Kamien (1992) for a survey 
on patent licensing, and Sen and Tauman (2007) for general licensing schemes), which focuses 
on the optimal licensing arrangement by the patentee in a wide variety of situations.
3
 
Interestingly, all these studies are done in a standard framework of price and/or quantity 
competition (i.e. the representative consumer approach of product differentiation) but very few 
studies are done in spatial framework.
4
 We believe that the spatial models, like Salop and 
Hotelling, are an appropriate place to study the licensing behaviour of firms in the industries 
where markets are already developed and not growing over time; while the differentiation over 
the brands is well established and is not changing rapidly. In a typical location model, the full 
market is always served and the demand does not change. We believe this particular feature in a 
location model is important, when one compares across equilibrium outcomes (equilibrium 
prices, profits of the firms) under different licensing regimes as the market size (or aggregate 
demand) remains constant across the regimes. Also, this feature in the location model has some 
advantage over standard models (e.g. Singh and Vives, 1984) of product differentiation. In the 
Singh and Vives (1984) model, the demand is elastic. Hence, comparisons between equilibrium 
values across different licensing regimes could be misleading because of varying aggregate 
demand across regimes. Thus, we find that Salop or Hotelling type spatial models are more 
appropriate place to study optimal licensing policies from different licensing regimes in 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
asymmetric and the patentee is relatively cost-inefficient compared to licensee under a Cournot duopoly; and 
obtained various interesting results. In this paper, among other things, we aim to pursue a similar story when firms 
are Bertrand competitors instead of Cournot.  
 
3
 In the literature, the results for optimal licensing policies under complete information frameworks are: if the 
patentee is an outsider, upfront fixed-fee licensing (or auctioning off a certain number of licenses) is optimal for the 
patentee (see Kamien & Tauman (1986); Katz & Shapiro (1986); also see Sen (2005), for an exception), whereas 
royalty licensing is optimal for the patentee when the patentee is an insider (see Rockett (1990); Wang (1998); 
Kamien & Tauman (2002); Erkal (2005)). There is also a small literature which has started to focus on the strategic 
trade policy in the presence of technology licensing (e.g. Kabiraj & Marjit (2003); Mukherjee & Pennings (2006); 
Mukherjee (2007); Ghosh & Saha (2008)) using various licensing schemes. 
 
4
 Patent licensing in a spatial model were initially studied by Caballero et. al. (2002); and Poddar & Sinha (2004). 
Caballero et. al. used Salop’s circular city model to analyze optimal licensing with one outsider patentee and two 
potential licensees when the licensees have the same marginal costs of production at the pre-licensing stage. On the 
other hand, Poddar and Sinha used Hotelling’s linear city model to analyze the case of an insider (as well as an 
outsider) patentee when competing firms have the same marginal costs of production at the pre-innovation stage (and 
pre-licensing stage for the outsider patentee case). Our analysis here in the Hotelling’s framework (see section 5) is 
an extension of Poddar and Sinha (2004), when firms are asymmetric in the pre-innovation stage.            
3 
 
developed and matured markets. It is also a study of optimal licensing policies in markets where 
products are horizontally differentiated. 
 In our spatial framework here, we consider a market with two firms, one patentee and the 
other is potential licensee. The patentee comes up with an innovation which brings down its unit 
cost of production. This is the starting point of our analysis. In the circular Salop model, firms are 
situated symmetrically on the circumference and in the linear Hotelling model firms located at 
the end points. Consumers are uniformly distributed over the circumference in the Salop model 
and over the linear segment in the Hotelling model. In each case, the locations of the competing 
firms are fixed. The good produced by both firms is identical in nature; however, due to the 
presence of transport cost incurred by the consumer to buy the good from either of the firms, the 
goods are horizontally differentiated in the eyes of the consumers. We consider two possible 
types of cost-reducing innovations from the patentee that are generally described in the literature, 
namely, the drastic and non-drastic innovations. In our analysis, we completely characterize the 
equilibrium licensing outcomes under the fixed fee and per-unit royalty, and find the optimal 
strategy of the patentee in offering (or not offering) the license to its rival.
5
  
As mentioned earlier, our major point of departure here from the existing literature is the 
asymmetry in initial costs of production in the pre-innovation stage. We show that when the 
patentee is efficient compared to the license; more specifically, when the marginal cost of 
production of the patentee is lower than that of the licensee before innovation, the results related 
to optimal licensing coincide with the traditional situation when both firms are symmetric with 
respect to the marginal costs at the pre-innovation stage. This result is true in Salop’s model as 
well as in Hotelling’s model. However, when the patentee is inefficient compared to the licensee 
in the pre-innovation stage, both in the Salop’s and Hotelling’s model, we find new results that 
were not obtained in the literature before. There we show that the initial cost asymmetry along 
with the size of the innovation can play a crucial role in determining the optimal licensing policy 
for the patentee. To that end, we find a drastic innovation can be optimally licensed using a 
royalty scheme when the patentee is highly inefficient compared to the licensee in the pre-
innovation stage but the size of the drastic innovation is not too large. In our study, we also 
completely characterize the optimal licensing policies of the patentee using a fixed fee and per-
                                                          
5
 Note that with one rival firm auctioning is not a choice and we also show that a two-part tariff licensing can never 
be optimal here. Thus considering only fixed fee and per-unit royalty scheme is sufficient to find optimal licensing 
strategy of the patentee under this set up. 
4 
 
unit royalty in all possible regimes of drastic and non-drastic innovations under both types of pre-
innovation cost asymmetry i.e. when the patentee is inefficient as well as efficient. We find that 
fixed fee licening alone is never optimal and is dominated either by royalty or no-licening. We 
show that it is dominated by royalty when the patent holder is inefficient in the pre-innovation 
stage and is dominated by no-licensing when the patent holder is efficient or firms are symmetric 
in the pre-innovation stage.   
In the literature Poddar and Sinha (2010) also analyze the situation of optimal patent 
licensing when the patenee is inefficient compared to the licensee in the pre-innovation stage. 
However, they considered a quantity competition in the product market and obtained a two-part 
tariff licensing (i.e. the licening contract consists of a fixed fee component and a royalty 
component) as optimal in various situations.
6
 In contrast to that study, here we consider price 
competition between the firms in the product market and showed that a two-part tariff licensing is 
never optimal. The contrasting results in these two scenarios arises due to the fact that under 
quantity competition, a fixed fee licening alone is shown to be optimal (when compared with 
royalty and no-licening) in certain situations, whereas in our study with price competition, a fixed 
fee licensing alone is shown to be never optimal in any situation. Thus a licensing strategy (like a 
two-part tariff contract) that consists a fixed fee component is never optimal in our framework. 
On the other hand, our results of optimal licensing under symmetric pre-innovations costs in 
Salop model or when the patentee is the efficient firm in Salop and Hotelling model, coincide 
with the results of Wang (1998, 2002) where the firms (i.e. the patentee and the licensee) are 
symmetric but compete in quantities.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set-up the Salop 
model for price competition. In section 3, we analyze optimal licensing under symmetric costs in 
Salop model. In section 4, we do our main analysis of optimal licensing under pre-innoivation 
asymmetric costs in Salop’s model. In section 5, a similar analysis is done in the Hotelling’s 
model. Section 6, concludes.  
 
2. Salop Model – Price Competition 
Consider a circular city with unit circumference and two firms A  and B  producing a 
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homogeneous good, and located symmetrically on the city. Suppose firm A  is located at 0  and 
firm B  is located at 2/1 . Consumers are uniformly distributed over the circular rim. Each buys 
exactly one unit of the good either from firm A or B. 
dx
~
gx
~
)2/(lB
)0(A
 
                                                                        Figure 1 
The utility function of a consumer located at x  and buying from firm A  is : 
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The utility function of a consumer located at x  and buying form firm B is : 
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We derive the demand for firms A and B by equating the utility of the person who is indifferent 
between buying from A or B. We distinguish here between two marginal consumers: the first one 
located at dx
~  and the second one at gx
~ . Assume the marginal costs of production of A and B are 
1c  and 2c . 
Demand function of firm A  is : 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
6
 The optimality of a two-part tariff licensing contract under complete information is also analysed by Fauli-Oller 
and Sandonis (2002) in the context of differentiated goods; by Sen and Tauman (2007) in a Cournot oligopoly and by 
Saracho (2002) in the context of strategic delegation. 
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Equilibrium prices are:    212211 423
6
1
=,243
6
1
= ccpccp                                         (1) 
Equilibrium profits are:   22123
36
1
= ccA 
  and   22123
36
1
= ccB 
                     (2) 
Equilibrium demands are :  12
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2
1
= ccDA   ,  21
3
1
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1
ccDB                                (3) 
 
3. Licensing under Symmetric Costs  
Assume the pre-innovation marginals costs of firm A and B are 1c cc 2 . Suppose the 
innovative firm A (also called patentee) comes up with a cost reducing innovation allowing to 
reduce the marginal cost of production by   which also measures the size of the innovation. 
Assume firm B is the potential licensee.  
A licensing game consists of three stages. In the first stage, the patent holding firm A 
decides whether to provide license or not to firm B for the new technology, and if decides to 
provide then it either sets a fixed licensing fee or a royalty rate. In the second stage, the rival firm 
B decides whether to accept or reject the offer from firm A. In the last stage, both firms compete 
in prices.  
Firm A sets a fixed fee or royalty rate in order to maximize the sum of the profit from its 
own production and the licensing revenue. In a fixed fee licensing scheme firm B must make an 
upfront fixed payment and in a royalty licensing scheme firm B must pay a fixed amount on each 
unit quantity produced using the new technology. 
 We will start with the case where firm A does not offer any license to firm B. We call this 
as no-licening (NL) regime. 
 
3.1  No Licensing 
In this regime, firm A profits alone from its innovation while firm B uses the old technology, 
Thus, cc =1  and cc =2 . Using (1) we get: 

3
2
2
1
=1 
 cp  and 
3
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2
1
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 cp  
Firm B  using the old technology can only make a non negative profit when 0BD or 
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2
3
<>2 
 cp . 
Thus the innovation is non drastic if 
2
3
<  and it is drastic otherwise.  
When innovation is not drastic 
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profit is .
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3.2  Fixed Fee Licensing 
In this regime, firm B  can use the new technology by paying the fixed fee denoted by F  to the 
patent holding firm. The maximum amount that firm A  can choose is equal to the increase of 
firm B ’s profit when using the new technology. Thus,
NL
B
F
BF  =  will ensure that firm 
B accepts to buy the license. 
Thus, firm A  and firm B will produce under unit costs ccc == 21 . Hence, from (2) we find : 
4
1
=A  and .
4
1
=B  
Equilibrium demands for firm A  and firm B are : 
2
1
=AD  and 
2
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=BD  
For a non drastic innovation, fixed fee equals:   3
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=F  
Thus, total profit of the patent holding firm is: 
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For a drastic innovation, fixed fee is:
4
1
=F  
Thus, total profit of the patent holding firm is: 
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=FA  
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Lemma 1 
In Salop’s circular model with symmetric firms, no licensing is always better than fixed fee for 
the patentee when innovation is drastic and  non drastic.
7
  
Proof 
For 
2
3
< , 0<
9
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3.3  Royalty Licensing 
In the royalty regime, the cost-reducing innovation is sold to the firm B using the royalty scheme. 
The maximum royalty that firm A can charge is   (given  r0 ). 
After licensing, the marginal costs of firms A  and B becomes respectively cc =1  and 
rcc =2 . From (1) we find equilibrium prices: rcp
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Thus, total profit of firm A under royalty licenisng is : 
=rA    






32
1
23
36
1 2 r
rr  
Note for firm B ’s demand to be positive: 0
32
1
= 
r
DB  which means that 
2
3
r .  
When innovation is non drastic, we have 
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7
 Same result is showed in Hotelling’s model of linear city by Poddar and Sinha (2004) where no licensing is always 
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2
3
<r  , we have optimal royalty as =r . 
For drastic case : 

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Summarizing the two cases we get: 
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Since fixed fee licensing is always dominated by no licensing as we have seen in Lemma 1, the 
optimal licenisng policy here is essentially a comparison between royalty and no licensing. 
 
Proposition 1 
In Salop circular’s model with symmetric firms, the patentee licenses its innovation using royalty 
when innovation is non drastic. For a drastic innovation, licensing does not occur and the 
patentee becomes a monopoly.8 
Proof 
For 
2
3
< ,  0.>
2
3
3
= 

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
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
 

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 Here two firms are active since 
2
3
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1
21  rpp  
which is verified. 
For 
2
3
> ,  0<
2
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4.  Licesning under Asymmetric Costs 
Now, we suppose that the unit production costs of the two firms A  and B  are not equal initially 
and let us first suppose that the patent holder is the inefficient firm i.e. 21 > cc  (we will denote by 
21= cc   the difference between the costs). Later we do the case where the patent holder is 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
found to be better than fixed fee licensing.  
8
 Same results are obtained in Wang (1998) under a Cournot duopoly and in Hotelling’s model of linear city by 
Poddar and Sinha (2004) under price competition. 
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efficient (i.e. 21 < cc  ). 
 
4.1  Inefficient Patentee  
4.1.1  Fixed Fee Licensing 
The two firms here use the new technology. Production unit costs of firms A  and B  are 
respectively 11 = cc
'
 and 22 = cc
'
. Using (1), (2) and (3) we can find equilirbrium prices, 
profits and demands. 
For a non-drastic innovation, (  
2
3
< ), the fixed fee is 
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Total revenue of the patent holder becomes 
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For a drastic innovation (  
2
3
> ), the fixed fee is  223
36
1
==   NLB
F
BF  
The total revenue for this case is 
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A  
Now to have both the firms active in the market under fixed fee licensing, we need to have 
equilibrium prices staisfy 
2
1
<12 pp   . 
We see that 5.1
2
3
<
2
1
<12  pp (using equilibrium prices). So this condition needs to be 
satisfied for a valid fixed fee licening regime. 
Summarizing the equlibrium profits for the patentee under fixed fee: 
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4.1.2  Royalty Licensing 
Similar to the symmetric case, the optimal royalty rate must be  r0  to ensure that firm B  
will buy the license. Production unit costs are 11 = cc
'
 and rcc
'
22 = . 
12 
 
Using (1) we find equilibrium prices as:  
 rccp 26243
6
1
= 211 
   ; 



  rccp 46423
6
1
= 212    
Using (3): Equilibrium demands are :  rccDA  12
3
1
2
1
=  ,  rccDB  21
3
1
2
1
=  
Using (2) : Equilibrium profits are :   22123
36
1
= rccrA   and   
2
2123
36
1
= rccrB   
Total revenue of the patent holder is :     





 rrrrDB
r
A
r
A 
3
1
2
1
23
36
1
==
2
 
Maximizing this total revenue with respect to the royalty rate we find : 
 


4
1
8
15
=
0<
9
4
=
1582
18
1
=
2
2













r
r
r
r
r
A
r
A
 
However, we must check that the optimal value r  is not higher than   and that the demand of 
firm B  is non-negative. In fact 
2
3
<0> rDB .  
We distinguish between two cases of non-drastic and drastic innovation.  
For non drastic innovation (  
2
3
< ), the optimal royalty rates are : 









2
1
> and  
2
3
<<
4
1
8
15
 if   
4
1
8
15
=
2
1
< and  
2
3
< if       =


r
r
              (4) and (5) 
For drastic innovation (  
2
3
> ), the optimal royalty rates are: 
 









2
1
>
2
3
<
4
1
8
15
 if     
4
1
8
15
=
2
1
<
4
1
8
15
<
2
3
 if   
2
3
=


r
r
                     (6) and (7) 
We also need to satisfy the condition 
2
1
<12 pp   for interior price equilibrium, so that both 
firms are active under royalty scheme. 
13 
 
Using equilibrium prices, 
2
1
<12 pp  
2
3
<<
2
3
   r  ;  and which is true if and only if 
4.5<  (proof see Appendix (i) where we also verfiy the legitimate values of all the optimal 
royaltes described from (4) to (7)). 
Summarizing the equlibrium profits for the patentee under royalty: 
  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
2
1
<  


















4
1
3
1
9
1
9
1
6
5
9
2
= 22 rA  1=
r
A  
2
1
>  
8
1
8
1
32
33
= 2 rA  
8
1
8
1
32
33
= 2 rA  
 
4.1.3  Fixed Fee versus Royalty Licensing 
We use the table below to compare between fixed fee and royalty licensing : 
  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
2
1
<   922
18
1
=  FA
r
A  
2
9
2
2
1
=  FA
r
A  
2
1
>  












32
25
24
5
72
1
9
2
3
1
9
1
= 22 FA
r
A
 2
72
7
8
1
32
17
=   FA
r
A  
  
Working out the signs of the expressions in each of these components in the above table (see 
Appendix (ii) for details), we get the following.
 9
  
  
2
3
   
2
3
>  
2
1
<  0>FA
r
A   0>
F
A
r
A   
57811.<<
2
1
  0>FA
r
A   0>
F
A
r
A   
                                                          
9
 Note that under fixed fee licening when both firms are active we must satisfy 5.1< ; hence considering the 
interval  57811.<<
2
1
 is sufficient. 
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Thus, we have the following result. 
Lemma 2 
In Salop’s circular model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is inefficient,  
royalty is always better than fixed fee irrespective of  drastic or  non drastic innovation. 
4.1.4  No Licensing 
Suppose now the patentee uses the new technology alone. Its production unit cost is 11 = cc
'
 
while the licensee firm B uses the old technology and its production unit cost is 22 = cc
'
.  
Under non-drastic innovation, the profits of the two firms in the non-drastic case are: 
  223
36
1
=  NLA  and   
2
23
36
1
=  NLB  
For a drastic innovation, firm B  leaves the market and the patent holder becomes a monopoly. In 
this case 
2
1
= 21 cp  ,  
2
1
=NLA
10
 and 0=
NL
B . 
Thus we have : 
  
2
3
<    
2
3
>   
Firm A    223
36
1
=  NLA   
2
1
=NLA  
Firm B    223
36
1
=  NLB  0=
NL
B  
 
4.1.5 Optimal Licensing 
So to find optimal licensing we need to compare only between royalty and no licening as we have 
seen fixed fee is always dominated by royalty in this case. Now consider the following table: 
  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
2
1
<    0>322
6
1
=   NLA
r
A  0<
2
3
=   NLA
r
A  
                                                          
10  
2
1
=
2
1
== 1211 cccp
NL
A  
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2
1
>  0>
32
25
24
5
72
1
3
1
9
2
9
1
= 22 

















  NLA
r
A
 32
49
8
7
8
1
= 2   NLA
r
A  
- to be signed 
  
Working out the signs of the expressions in each of these components in the above table (see 
Appendix (iii) for details), we get the following.
 
 
 
 
2
3
<  
Non-Drastic 
Case                     
32
49
8
7
8
1
<<
2
3 2    
        Drastic Case 
32
49
8
7
8
1
> 2    
    Drastic Case 
2
1
<  NL
A
r
A >  
NL
A
r
A <  
2
1
>  NL
A
r
A >  
NL
A
r
A >  
NL
A
r
A <  
 
Thus, we have our main result. 
Proposition 2 
In Salop’s circular model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is inefficient,  
royalty licensing is optimal for a non drastic innovation. 
In the drastic case, royalty can be optimal only when pre-innovation cost asymmetry is large (i.e. 
2
1
> ) and the size of the innovation is intermediate (i.e. when 
32
49
8
7
8
1
<<
2
3 2   ). For 
all other drastic innovations, the patentee does not license its technology and becomes a 
monopoly. 
 
Intuition: In the case of non-drastic innovation, royalty licensing is optimal since by charging an 
appropriate per unit royalty the patentee can hold its cost advantage when it competes and at the 
same time collects the extra revenue coming from royalty.
11
 In this case, the pre-innovation costs 
asymmetry does not have any effect. However, in the case of drastic innovation, the pre-
innovation costs asymmetry and the size of the drastic innovation could matter in the following. 
For a large enough initial cost difference and with a moderate innovation, the efficiency gain is 
16 
 
significant when the production is also shifted to the efficient licensee, and this gain then can be 
appropriated by charging a suitable royalty. However, when the drastic innovation is really large, 
then the initial costs asymmetry again does not matter, and in that case no-licensing i.e. staying as 
monopoly is more beneficial to the patentee. 
Corollary 
In Salop’s circular model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, given that fixed fee is never a 
part of optimal licensing, a two-part tariff licensing can never be optimal as well. 
 
4.2  Efficient Patentee 
Now let us consider the situation when the patentee is efficient in costs (i.e. 021  cc ) 
4.2.1  No Licensing and Fixed Fee Licesning 
In the case of no licensing (under non-drastic innovation) as well as for fixed fee licensing, the 
demand of firm B  is positive only when 
2
3
>   (see 12) 
  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
F
A  


















4
1
3
1
9
1
9
2
3
1
9
1 22   
2
1
9
2 2   
NL
A    
2
23
36
1
    
2
1
 
NL
A
F
A     2
9
2
   1
9
2 2  
  
Under non drastic innovation :  
2
3
<  with 0<<
2
3
 , we find : FA
NL
A >  
Under drastic innovation :  
2
3
>  with 0<<
2
3
 , we also find FA
NL
A > .  
Lemma 3 
In Salop’s circular model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is efficient,  
offering no license is better than fixed fee irrespective of  drastic or  non drastic innovation. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
11 Note in the case of no licensing, the only advantage of the patentee is just the cost advantage. 
12  ''B ccD 21
3
1
2
1
=    in a fixed fee licensing 11 = cc
'
 and 22 = cc
'
.  
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Note that this result is qualititively same as Lemma 1 under summtric pre-innovation costs. 
 
4.2.2  Royalty Licensing 
Optimal r  maximizing the total revenue of the patent holder is 
4
1
8
15
=* r  
Demand of firm B  must be positive : 0>BD 
2
3
<r  
Since r<0  then we must have 
2
3
>0>
2
3
   (in this case : 0<<
2
3
 ) 
Also since r  we have: 
=r  if  
2
3
<  

2
3
=r  if  
2
3
>  
The optimal royalty rate when the innovation is non drastic here is =r . To have a Nash 
equilibrium with two firms , we must have 
2
3
<<
2
3
2
1
<12   rpp . We can check that 
2
3
<<
2
3
   since 
2
3
<0<   and 
2
3
<   (non drastic case). 
Total revenue of the patentee under royalty are as follows : 
  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
0<<
2
3
  


















4
1
3
1
9
1
9
1
6
5
9
2
= 22 rA  1=
r
A  
 
4.2.3  Optimal Licensing  
It has to be a comparison between royalty licening and no-licensing as no-licensing is always 
better than fixed fee. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
Then 
2
3
>
2
1
>
3
1
0>
3
1
2
1
=  BD  
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  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
0<<
2
3
    0>322
6
1
=   NLA
r
A  0<
2
3
=   NLA
r
A  
 
 
Proposition 3 
In Salop’s circular model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is efficient,  
we find the same results as in a Salop model with symmteric costs (proposition 1) where royalty 
is optimal when innovation is non drastic and non licensing is optimal when the innovation is 
drastic.  
 
5.  Licening under Hotelling’s Model with Asymmetric Costs 
This is an extension of Poddar and Sinha (2004) for the case of insider patentee. Poddar and 
Sinha assumed symmetric pre-innovation costs of the patentee and the licensee, and analysed 
optimal licensing policies. Here we find the optimal licensing policy for the patentee when the 
pre-innovation costs are not symmetric. Like Salop’s model, first we will suppose that the 
patentee is not efficient in costs ( 21 > cc ) and later we deal with the case when it is efficient 
( 21 < cc ). Like Poddar and Sinha (2004), we also assume that the patentee and the potential 
licensee are located at the end points of the linear city. 
Thus, the location of the marginal consumer: 
xpU A  1=  
)(1= 2 xpUB   
Demands are : 












1p0   if   p
1  pp-1   if   p
2
pp
2
1
-1 p1  if   p
D
21
212
21
21
A =  












1p   if   p
1  pp-1   if   p
2
pp
2
1
1 p  if   p
D 21B
12
121
12
1
0
=  
19 
 
The profits are: 
 













 


1p0   if   p
1  pp-1   if   p
2
pp
2
1
cp
-1 p  if   pcp
21
212
21
21
A 11
11
=  
 













 


1p   if   pcp
1  pp-1   if   p
2
pp
2
1
cp
1 p  if   p
21
B
1222
12122
120
=  
Thus when 1<21 pp   we have 
  




 

22
1
= 2111
pp
cpA  
  




 

22
1
= 2122
pp
cpB  
Maximizing profits with respect to the prices we find equilibrium prices as: 
211
3
1
3
2
1= ccp   
212
3
2
3
1
1= ccp   
Equilibrium profits are : 
 2213
18
1
= ccA   
2
213
18
1
= 



  ccB  
Equilibrium demands are : 




  21
6
1
2
1
= ccDA  




  21
6
1
2
1
= ccDB  
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5.1  Inefficient Patentee 
The patentee is inefficient compared to the licensee and thus ( 0>= 21 cc  ). 
5.1.1  Fixed Fee Licensing 
In a fixed fee licensing, the marginal costs of firm A  and firm B  respectively are  11 = cc
'
 
and  22 = cc
'
. The equilibrium prices are : 
    1
3
1
3
2
=
3
1
3
2
1=
3
1
3
2
1= 2121211  ccccccp
''
  
    1
3
2
3
1
=
3
2
3
1
1=
3
2
3
1
1= 2121212  ccccccp
''
  
Equilibrium profits are: 
          2212221
2
21 3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=   cccccc
''F
A  
          2221221
2
21 3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=   cccccc
''F
B  
Equilibrium Demands are: 
        
62
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
= 212121

  ccccccD
''
A  
        
62
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
= 212121

  ccccccD
''
B  
The fixed fee that the patentee charges is 
NL
B
F
BF  =  
Below we summarize the relevant equilibrium expressions: 
 Non Drastic innovation 
Drastic 
innovation 
  3<   3  
F
A   
2
3
18
1
   23
18
1
  
NL
B   
2
3
18
1
  0  
NL
B
F
BF  =   62
18


  23
18
1
  
21 
 
F
B   
2
3
18
1
   23
18
1
  
FFA
F
A  =  


















2
1
3
1
18
1
9
1
3
1
18
1 22   1
9
1 2   
For an interior equilibrium prices we must have : 1<12 pp  . Using equilibrium prices we get: 

3
1
=
3
1
3
1
=1
3
1
3
2
1
3
2
3
1
= 12212112 ccccccpp 











  
Hence for vaild equilibrium prices under fixed fee licensing we satisfy the following condition : 
3<1<
3
1
1<12   pp  
 
5.1.2  Royalties Licensing 
Production unit costs here become :  11 = cc
'
 and  rcc
'
22 =  
    1
3
1
3
2
3
1
=
3
1
3
2
1=
3
1
3
2
1= 2121211  ccrrccccp
''
  
    1
3
2
3
1
3
2
=
3
2
3
1
1=
3
2
3
1
1= 2121212  ccrrccccp
''
  
Equilibrium profits are: 
        2221
2
21 3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=   rrcccc
''r
A  
        2221
2
21 3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=   rrcccc
''r
B  
Equilibrium demands are: 
          rrccccD ''A 3
6
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
= 2121  
          rrccccD ''B 3
6
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
= 2121  
Total revenue of firm A  after licensing is : 
     rrrrDB
r
A
r
A 3
6
1
3
18
1
==
2
 
  
4
1
4
15
=154
18
1
= 

 rr
r
r
A  
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Now     3<0>3
6
1
0> rrDB  , we also must check that <r  
Thus, we find : 
For a non drastic innovation  3<  







1    and    3
4
1
4
15
    if    
4
1
4
15
1    and    3    if   
*
*


r
r
 
For a drastic innovation  3>  








1        3
4
1
4
15
    if    
4
1
4
15
1       
4
1
4
15
3    if    3
*
*


r
r
 
Checking for the condition: 1<12 pp   

3
1
3
1
=
3
1
3
1
3
1
=1
3
1
3
2
3
1
1
3
2
3
1
3
2
= 21212112 











 rccrccrccrpp  
Now,   3<<3
3
1
1<
3
1
<
3
1
11<
3
1
3
1
<11<12 rrrpp  
The royalty rates are valid when    3<<3 r  which is true if and only if 9 (using the 
fact :  





  
4
1
4
15
=3 r ) 
Total revenue of the firm A  is : 
     rrrrA 3
6
1
3
18
1
=
2
 and using 





 
4
1
4
15
=r , we get the following: 
Total Revenue at equilibrium: 
16
33
8
1
16
1
=
4
1
4
15
3
6
1
4
1
4
15
4
1
4
15
3
18
1 2
2






























    
 
  3<   3>  
1<  


















2
1
3
1
18
1
18
1
6
5
9
1
= 22 rA  2=
r
A  
1>  
16
33
8
1
16
1
= 2  rA  
16
33
8
1
16
1
= 2  rA  
23 
 
5.1.3  Comparison Between Fixed Fee and Royalty Licensing: 
  3<   3>  
1<    0>9
18
= 

 FA
r
A  0>1
9
1
= 2  FA
r
A  
1>  












16
25
24
5
144
1
9
1
3
1
18
1
= 22 FA
r
A
 2
144
7
8
1
16
17
=   FA
r
A  
Working out the signs of the expressions in each of these components in the above table (see 
Appendix (iv) for details), we get the following.
 
 
   3<   3>  
1<  FA
r
A  >  
F
A
r
A  >  
3.563<<1   FA
r
A  >  
F
A
r
A  >  
 
Lemma 4 
In Hotelling’s model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is inefficient,  
royalty is always better than fixed fee irrespective of  drastic or  non drastic innovation. 
Note that this result is qualititively same as Lemma 2. 
 
5.1.4  No Licensing 
The production unit costs of respectively firm A  and firm B  are 11 = cc
'
 and 22 = cc
'
 
The prices at the equilibrium are : 
  1
3
1
3
2
3
2
=
3
1
3
2
1=
3
1
3
2
1= 2121211  ccccccp
''
  
  1
3
2
3
1
3
1
=
3
2
3
1
1=
3
2
3
1
1= 2121212  ccccccp
''
  
For a non drastic innovation (  3< ), the equilibrium profits are: 
        2221221
2
21 3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=   cccccc
''
A  
        2221221
2
21 3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=3
18
1
=   cccccc
''
B  
Equilibrium demands are : 
24 
 
         
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1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
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1
2
1
= 212121 ccccccD
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A  
         
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
= 212121 ccccccD
''
B  
For a drastic innovation (  3 ) we have: 
1= 2 cpA  and        1=1== 1211 cccpA  
0=B  
Summarizing profits under no licensing : 
  3<   3  
NL
A   
2
3
18
1
    1  
NL
B   
2
3
18
1
  0  
  
5.1.5  Optimal Licesing 
We need to compare between royalty licening and no licensing only as fixed fee is always 
dominated by royalty. 
  3<   3>  
1<    0>3
6
=  

 NLA
r
A  0<)(3=  
NL
A
r
A  
1>  


















16
25
24
5
144
1
3
1
9
1
18
1
= 22  NLA
r
A
  
16
49
8
7
16
1
= 2NLA
r
A  
 
Working out the signs of the expressions in each of these components in the above table (see 
Appendix (iv) for details), we get the following.
 
 
 
 3<  
Non Drastic 
Case 
16
49
8
7
16
1
<<3 2    
         Drastic Case 
16
49
8
7
16
1
> 2    
       Drastic Case 
1<  NLA
r
A >  
NL
A
r
A <  
1>  NLA
r
A >  
NL
A
r
A >  
NL
A
r
A <  
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Proposition 4 
In Hotelling’s linear model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is 
inefficient,  royalty licensing is optimal for a non drastic innovation. 
In the drastic case, royalty can be optimal only when pre-innovation cost asymmetry is large (i.e. 
1> ) and the size of the innovation is intermediate (i.e. when 
16
49
8
7
16
1
<<3 2   ). 
For all other drastic innovations, the patentee does not license its technology and becomes a 
monopoly.13 
 
5.2  Efficient Patentee 
Let’s now suppose an efficient patentee, thus ( 0<= 21 cc  ) 
5.2.1  No Licensing and Fixed Fee Licesning 
In the case of no licensing (under non-drastic innovation) as well as for fixed fee licensing the 
demand of firm B  is positive only when 3>  (see 14) 
  
2
3
<   
2
3
>  
F
A  


















2
1
3
1
18
1
9
1
3
1
18
1 22   1
9
1 2   
NL
A   
2
3
18
1
   1  
NL
A
F
A    

2
9
   2
9
1 2  
  
Now for the non-drastic case :  3<  with :0<<3   
It can be shown that   0<2
9
= 

  NLA
F
A   
For drastic case :  3  with 0<<3   : 
It can be shown that 





  2
9
1
=2
9
1
= 22NLA
F
A
 
Now for 0<<3   we have 2
9
1
>3 2   , hence  NLA
F
A <  
                                                          
13
 Here the intuition is same as described after Proposition 2. 
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Lemma 5 
In Hotelling’s linear model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is efficient,  
offering no license is better than fixed fee irrespective of  drastic or  non drastic innovation. 
Note that this result is qualititively same as Lemma 3. 
 
5.2.2  Royalty Licensing 
Optimal royalty rates when 0<  are : =r  for a non drastic innovation and  3=r  for a 
drastic innovation. 
Since 0>r  then we must have 3>0>3    (in this case : 0<<3  ) 
  3<   3>  
0<<3   =r   3=r  
We also verify that    3<<31<21 rpp . 
The total revenues of the patent holder under royalty licensing are: 
  3<   3>  
0<<3   





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




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Comparing total revenue of the patentee under royalty licensing and non licensing we get: 
  3<   3>  
0<<3     0>3
6
=  

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r
A  0<)(3=  
NL
A
r
A  
  
Then we have the following result: 
 
Proposition 5 
In Hotelling’s linear model with pre-innovation asymmetric costs, when the patentee is efficient,  
we find the same results as in Salop’s or Hotelling’s model with symmetric costs. Royalty is 
optimal when innovation is non drastic and non licensing is optimal when the innovation is 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
14     0>
2
1
6
1
=
6
1
2
1
=
6
1
2
1
= 2121   ccccD
''
B  iff 3>
2
1
>
6
1
   
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drastic.  
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we considered the problem of optimal licensing strategy of an insider 
patentee to a poetntial licensee in a circular city of Salop’s model and in a linear city of 
Hotelling’s model. Firms have asymmeytric pre-innovation marginal costs of production and 
compete in prices in the product market. The patentee comes up with an innovation which brings 
down its unit cost of production. In the circular Salop model, firms are situated symmetrically on 
the circumference and in the linear Hotelling model firms located at the end points. Consumers 
are uniformly distributed over the circumference in the Salop model and over the linear segment 
in the Hotelling model. The good produced by both firms is identical in nature; however, due to 
the presence of transport cost incurred by the consumer to buy the good from either of the firms, 
the goods are horizontally differentiated in the eyes of the consumers. We consider two possible 
types of cost-reducing innovations from the patentee that are generally described in the literature, 
namely, the drastic and non-drastic innovations and completely characterize the equilibrium 
licensing outcomes under the fixed fee and per-unit royalty in order to find the optimal strategy 
of the patentee in offering (or not offering) the license to its rival. We find that when the 
innovative firm is efficient compared to the licensee at the pre-innovation stage then the results 
regarding optimal licensing policy coincide with the results described in the literature when firms 
are symmetric in the pre-innovation stage. This result is true in Salop’s model as well as in 
Hotelling’s model. However, this is not true when the innovative firm is inefficient in the pre-
innovation stage compared to the licensee. To that end, we show that both in Salop’s and 
Hotelling’s model, a drastic innovation can be licensed using a royalty scheme when the patentee 
is highly inefficient compared to licensee in the pre-innovation stage and the size of the 
innovation is intermediate. We also show that in this set-up, fixed fee licensing alone is never 
optimal.  
Note that in this paper, we only dealt with the case of an insider patentee. In our future 
work, we plan to consider the case of an outsider patentee in a similar framework of spatial 
competition. 
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Appendix (i) 
From (4) we get: when  
2
3
<  and 
2
1
<  , we find =r  
Check two firms are always active here 
 
2
3
<<
2
3
 r  
2
3
<<
2
3
  , verified since 
2
3
<   (non drastic case) ; and 
30 
 
0<
2
3
2
1
<   then  <0<
2
3
  
From (5) we get : when  
2
3
<  and 
2
1
>  , we find 
4
1
8
15
= r  
Check two firms are active here only when 4.5<  
2
3
<
4
1
8
15
<
2
3
2
3
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2
3
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<
4
1
8
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  ; and 
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3
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From (6) we get : when  
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3
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2
1
<  , we find 
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=r  
Check two firms are always active here 
2
3
<
2
3
<
2
3
2
3
<<
2
3
   r  verified 
From (7) we get : when  
2
3
>  and 
2
1
>  , we find 
4
1
8
15
= r  
Check two firms are active here only when 4.5<  
2
3
<
4
1
8
15
<
2
3
2
3
<<
2
3
   r , verified since .
2
1
>
2
3
<
4
1
8
15
        
And 4.5<
4
1
8
15
<
2
3
   
 
Appendix (ii) 
*when  
2
3
<  and 
2
1
<  we have   0>922
18
1
=  FA
r
A  since  
2
9
<
2
3
<  
for 
2
1
<  
*when  
2
3
>  and 
2
1
<  we have 0>
2
3
2
3
9
2
=
9
2
2
1
= 2 











 FA
r
A
 since 
2
1
<  
*when  
2
3
>  and 
2
1
>  we have 
32
17
8
1
72
7
=
72
7
8
1
32
17
= 22  FA
r
A  
the roots of the polynomial 
32
17
8
1
72
7 2    are 20673.= '  and 57811.=''  
31 
 
if 57811.<<
2
1
  then 0>
72
7
8
1
32
17
= 2  FA
r
A  
*when  
2
3
<  and 
2
1
>  we have 












32
25
24
5
72
1
9
2
3
1
9
1
= 22 FA
r
A
 
This polynomial can be solved if the discriminant term 0>
4
153
97= 2    
we can check that 0<  when 57811.<<
2
1
 no roots 0>FA
r
A   
 
Appendix (iii) 
For  
2
3
<  and 
2
1
<  esay to see that   0>322
6
1
=   NLA
r
A  
For  
2
3
<  and 
2
1
>  we have 


















32
25
24
5
72
1
3
1
9
2
9
1
= 22  NLA
r
A
 
Studying the sign of this polynomial we find that roots are 
4
33
2
4
3
2
3
= 2  
'
 and 
4
33
2
4
3
2
3
= 2  
''
. Note that 
'
 and 
''
  exists since 0
4
332  . Next we 
verify that 0
'
  and 0>)
2
3
(  
''
 
15
. 
Thus, we have the following :   
2
3
0
'
 
''
  
Thus, we can say that if 
2
1
>  and  
2
3
then : 
NL
A
r
A
NL
A
r
A  >0>
32
25
24
5
72
1
3
1
9
2
9
1
= 22 

















  
For  
2
3
>  and 
2
1
<  easy to see that 0<
2
3
=   NLA
r
A  since 
NL
A
r
A  <
2
3
>   
For  
2
3
>  and 
2
1
>  we have  
32
49
8
7
8
1
= 2NLA
r
A  
we distinguish here between two cases: 
32 
 
 If 
2
3
 
32
49
8
7
8
1
<< 2    then NLA
r
A
NL
A
r
A  >0>   
 If 
32
49
8
7
8
1
> 2    then NLA
r
A
NL
A
r
A  <0<   
 
Appendix (iv) 
For 1>  and  3>  we have 2
144
7
8
1
16
17
=   FA
r
A  
For 2
144
7
8
1
16
17
  , solution is: 
41346.=2
7
24
7
9
  
5633.=
7
9
2
7
24
  
If 5633.<<1   then FA
r
A
F
A
r
A  >0>  
For 1>  and  3<  we have 












16
25
24
5
144
1
9
1
3
1
18
1
= 22 FA
r
A
 
The discriminant term 
2718153=    
Solution is: 
41346.=2
7
24
7
9
  
5633.=
7
9
2
7
24
  
then 
0<  if 5633.<  no solutions   0>FA
r
A  
F
A
r
A  >  
 
Appendix (v) 
* for  3>  and 1>  






 
16
49
8
7
16
1
=
16
49
8
7
16
1
= 22NLA
r
A  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
15
 Check that 0>3
4
33
2
4
3
=)
2
3
(
4
33
2
4
3
2
3 22    
33 
 
we have:   





 3>
16
49
8
7
16
1 2  since   >
16
1
8
1
16
1
=3
16
49
8
7
16
1 22  





  0  
Then if 
16
49
8
7
16
1
<<3 2    we have  0>NLA
r
A   
NL
A
r
A >  
while if 
16
49
8
7
16
1
> 2    we have  0<NLA
r
A   
NL
A
r
A <  
 
* For  3<  and 1>  



















16
25
24
5
144
1
3
1
9
1
18
1
= 22  NLA
r
A
 



















16
25
24
5
144
1
3
1
9
1
18
1 22   
Solution is: 
22332
4
3
3=  
'
 
22332
4
3
3=  
''
 
we can check that 0>233=
2   (we have two solutions) 
0<2332
4
3
3= 2 
'
 
    62332
4
3
=32332
4
3
3=3 22  
''
 
the difference between the squares is : 
0>
8
9
4
9
8
9
=362332
4
3 2
2
2 





   
    3>
''
 
 
'''
 <3<<0<   then 
NL
A
r
A
NL
A
r
A  >0>
16
25
24
5
144
1
3
1
9
1
18
1
= 22 

















  
 
